



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

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IMPERIAL FEDERATION:

NAVAL AND MILITARY.

BY

CAPT. J. C. R. COLOMB,

FORMERLY R.M.A.



A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION,
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Monday, May 31, 1886.

FIELD-MARSHAL H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, K.G.,
G.C.B., &c., &c., President, in the Chair.

(H.R.H. the PRINCE OF WALES was present at the meeting.)

IMPERIAL FEDERATION—NAVAL AND MILITARY.

"You know that if there is one thing more than another that I hope to live for and take part in politically, it is that, before I die, I may see the British realm a realm extending all the world over, and her children whom she has sent out themselves self-governing communities, united together in a bond of peace that shall be an example to the world."—Extract from Speech, delivered August 1, 1885, by the late W. E. FORSTER, M.P., First Chairman of the Imperial Federation League.

By Capt. J. C. R. COLOMB, formerly R.M.A.

IN the time allotted it will be impossible to do more than sketch the outlines of the subject. Before proceeding to do this it is necessary to review general considerations in order to avoid confusion if not dangerous misconceptions. The main features of Imperial Federation are—

- 1st. The unity of the Empire.
- 2nd. The developments necessary to preserve it.

The first is based on the present universal acceptance of the declaration that it is to the mutual material advantage of all parts of the Empire to be united.

We have here the expression not merely of a patriotic sentiment, but a direct reference to practical utility. Sentiment is a great force, but its strength for practical purposes is in proportion to self-interest. Mutual advantage is the strongest bond, and the measures most calculated to secure the permanency of the Imperial Union are those which best foster and promote common benefits conferred by that union.

In discussing Imperial Federation from any point of view there is danger of confusion between the end sought to be accomplished and the means by which that end can be attained. The end sought is not the adoption of one particular plan or scheme for the transaction of such affairs of the Empire as are of common concern to all its parts. It is something much more simple—the strengthening of Imperial Unity. The means to secure that end are such constitutional developments of the Imperial civil, naval, and military machinery as are necessitated by progress and growth, and are by mutual consent acknowledged to be for mutual advantage.

Imperial Federation has to do with facts—commercial, political, naval, and military facts—and not with the theoretical construction of a "brand new constitution" for the Empire. Walpole tells us that when Lord Holland was asked by an Italian Minister to draft a

constitution for the little State of Naples, he replied "You might as well ask me to build a tree." The Imperial Federationist does not propose to build trees, but he points to what have been long ago planted, and asks for a recognition of growth and that demands of development shall be satisfied.

Let us now briefly examine what it is we have planted; what has been the extent and nature of its growth; and what are the demands of a naval and military character made by the development of these interests, which war forces may be required at any moment to preserve.

What we have Planted.

Our flag has been planted in territories beyond sea by three distinct processes—conquest, cession, and settlement. Some portions we owe to the sword, some to diplomacy, others to the natural overflow of population. Those who think that Empire means war need to be reminded that out of eight and a half million square miles of British territory, only about one and a half million square miles have been directly acquired by war or by diplomacy. Some seven million square miles represent the proportion contributed to our Empire by the pursuits and enterprises of peace. Industrial and commercial progress has won for us some seven-eighths of our Empire. It has also created new liabilities, introduced novel conditions, and accumulated responsibilities which must be met if the unity of the Empire is to survive in war. Keeping to the special subject before us it may be said that what we have in three distinct ways planted, are new maritime and territorial conditions of British defence.

It is to be noted that the great bulk of our territory acquired by conquest or diplomacy lies in the tropics and sub-tropics. Here we have to deal with dense populations ever on the increase, and with varieties of races in every stage of progress or decay. Here also we have to deal with climatic and other conditions which forbid all prospect of the natural growth and expansion of our own race ever being really localized. These limbs of Empire for prosperity, for protection, and for peace depend upon the strength of our influence and power. The main source of that strength must be drawn from centres of civilization which has its only permanent abiding place in the temperate zones. For protection from external attack or foreign intrigue, and for security against internal anarchy, they depend upon military and administrative means furnished from without. As component parts of our Empire their relations to the rest are the relations of the numerically strong to the numerically weak, yet of the governed to the governing power. These territories form in the aggregate an Empire of Dependencies, and in Table I will be found a general statement as to some facts of its present conditions. It includes, as will be observed, India, the West Indies, Possessions on West Coast of Africa, the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, and very many other isolated positions which are in the true sense of the term dependencies, though not necessarily in the tropics or sub-tropics.

Turning now to other portions of the Empire which lie almost wholly in the temperate zones—the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the Colonies of Australasia and those of British South Africa, in these the characteristic features completely differ from those presented by the Empire of Dependencies.

In British North America and Australasia populations are yet so small in proportion to area that they may in that respect be said to be at present infinitesimal. We have there but a residuum of aborigines gradually disappearing before the advance of civilization by a natural process of absorption or decay. In Canada there is a considerable population of French origin, but thoroughly loyal to the Crown. British South Africa presents circumstances of an exceptional character. There we have aboriginal races numerically immensely in excess at present of European population. The European population itself contains a preponderating proportion of Dutch origin, loyal to the Crown. In all these territories the backbone of the population is Anglo-Saxon. The populations there owe their presence to that spirit of energy and enterprise which led men and still leads them to “*home away*” from the Old World to the New. In every one of these territories climatic conditions and all circumstances favour the unrestricted growth and practically unlimited expansion of our race. Were the thirty-six millions of people crowded together in these two small islands of ours spread over the habitable portions of those territories they would still be but very sparsely populated. For internal prosperity and for progress these Colonies mainly depend upon themselves, not upon us. They look to increase of population by natural growth and to immigration of “*bone and sinew*” from the Old World, to ensure for them a great and glorious future under the old flag. For the maintenance of social order they no longer require the guidance or the assistance of the mother country. Canada, with special internal difficulties, without any parallel in Australasia, has recently shown she needs no external help to suppress rebellion and re-establish law. Such military means as are necessary for the security of internal order are furnished from within not from without. The relations of these component parts of the Empire to the mother country are the relations now of numerically weak to numerically strong distributions of one and the same people. They are not the relations of the governed to the governing power, but of absolute freedom based upon the common attributes of political, social, and moral equality. Our Colonies are tied to us by loyalty to the same Crown, the forces of a common sentiment, and by a sense of present mutual advantage. The bonds may be permanently injured or for ever destroyed by a war for which neither the Colonies nor we were adequately prepared.

These territories in the aggregate make up the Colonial Empire respecting which some useful information will be found in Table II.

What we have planted then beyond sea may be grouped under two distinct heads, the Empire of Dependencies and the Colonial Empire. One is the artificial product, the other the natural offspring of the Home Empire of the United Kingdom.

Table III gives, for purposes of comparison, similar information relating to the Home Empire, as already given for the other two.

A summary of all three is shown in Table IV.

The tenure by the Home Empire of the Empire of Dependencies is that of administrative capacity and of power. The association of the Colonial with the Home Empire is that of kinship, consent, and a common loyalty to a common crown. The existing connection between the Colonial Empire and the Empire of Dependencies is through the Home Empire of the United Kingdom. They form together a trinity of strength or of weakness precisely in proportion to their power of combination for common security. That power must develop fresh strength in the ratio of the demands and necessities of growth. In other words, it depends upon the furthering now and in the future of all such measures as shall increase mutual advantages in peace, and secure organized co-operation for mutual defence in war. These are briefly the principles of Imperial Federation. They are applicable alike to political, commercial, naval, and military considerations. The recognition of their importance must precede practical action, and the realization of the influences and the facts of growth is the first step towards that recognition.

Let us now therefore briefly examine

The Nature and Extent of Growth.

For purposes of illustrating growth it is necessary to fix standard dates. It is fitting to take as one the present time, when products of our Empire are gathered under one roof in London, and subjects of our Queen are flocking together from all parts of the world-wide dominions of the Crown. For a past date, I select the period of the great International Exhibition of 1851. Thus we shall measure during the past thirty-five years broad facts of British progress at home and abroad, such as population, trade, shipping, and revenue. Table V shows the condition of the three great divisions of our Empire in 1851. I dismiss area as evidence of growth because during this period we have not only acquired fresh territory, but have also parted with it in Europe, Africa, and North America.

For purposes of rough illustration let us take the United Kingdom, on the one hand and the whole outlying Empire on the other, and compare at these two dates—1851 and the present time—the one and the other.

Table VI so compares the population, trade, shipping, and revenue then and now. The broad lessons it teaches may be summed up as follows:—

1st. That the aggregate year's trade of the outlying Empire now exceeds by over one hundred millions sterling the total value of the whole trade of the United Kingdom only thirty-five years ago.

2nd. While one year's trade then (1851) of the United Kingdom was nearly treble the value of the aggregate annual trade of the Empire beyond the sea, it does not now exceed it by even 50 per cent.

The movement of shipping in and out of port furnishes a standard also of relative interest on the seas and oceans of the world. The diagram illustrates these main facts:—

1st. That in 1851 the aggregate tonnage entering and clearing British ports at home was more than double the aggregate tonnage entering and clearing British ports abroad. Now, however, it will be seen the tonnage entered and cleared our ports abroad in the year is greater by some 13,000,000 tons than in the case of our ports at home. I remind you that this excess alone is about the equivalent of the total tonnage in and out of all our home ports during the year of the Great Exhibition, 1851.

Here, then, we have the creation by natural growth of new, great, changed, and changing interest requiring protection in war.

Upon readiness, sufficiency, and combined action of Fleet and Army this vast trade for its security in war entirely relies. Upon its safety depends not merely the wealth and greatness of the British Empire, but its power to lead onward and undisturbed in the civilization of the world. Upon the adequate protection of Imperial trade in war will depend not merely the comfort but the *bread* of scores of millions of toilers geographically separated by seas but under one flag. The original sources of material power of defence are men and money. Diagram VI shows not only the growing and changing interests we may have at any moment to defend, but it also indicates increase and changing positions of the material resources of dormant defensive power. The possession of such original resources as men and money is one thing however, while their proper adaptation and sufficient appropriation for purposes of defence is another. As regards the simple fact of their possession this diagram shows—

1st. That, roughly speaking, during the last thirty-five years there has been an increase of the Queen's subjects at home of nearly 10,000,000, while over sea the addition amounts to nearly 40,000,000.

2nd. That in 1851 the annual revenue of the United Kingdom was nearly double the aggregate revenue of the Empire beyond sea, while now the aggregate revenue of the Empire beyond sea exceeds by 22,000,000*l.* sterling that of the mother country.

Such then are a few broad features of these comparisons. There are many others of importance I now pass by, the subject being large and the time of explanation short. Having hastily examined what we in the past planted, and having glanced at the nature and extent of growth, let us now take a general survey of some other changes which have occurred.

It is necessary to note without remark those constitutional changes, due to Colonial growth, occurring since 1851, so far as they affect arrangements for defence. Canadian Provinces have combined and formed one great Dominion, spreading from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with one Parliament initiating and controlling measures for its local defence. It has joined the oceans by railway communication. Newfoundland possesses a separate Parliament, charged with providing for its local defence. In South Africa there is also now a Parliament, exercising the same functions over a portion of that

territory. At the antipodes there are six separate Parliaments possessing similar powers of arrangement for the defence of six separate portions of Australasia. I merely add to this bald statement that it is quite at the discretion of these nine Parliaments, in combination with our own, with each other, or separately, to provide means of defence for these great common interests which lie beyond their shores.

While the common interests of the Empire and Parliaments have been growing, science has been busy revolutionizing the mode and means of war. The changes it has accomplished may be here sufficiently described in a few words. In the first place, it takes almost as many years now to build war-ships and great guns as in bygone times it took months. On the other hand, the use of arms of all branches of the Service in the past could be picked up in a hurry, and even during a campaign. The scientific weapons now demand long and elaborate training; in short, broadly speaking, what science has done is to enable rapid and decisive results to be produced in war, but *only* by long previous preparations and the development during peace of an organized system and plan. Effective and successful defence will therefore wholly depend in war upon the elaboration of organized arrangements and provision of means during peace. These cannot now be improvised when the time for their application has arrived. The necessary naval and military arrangements between the several parts of the same Empire to secure common safety for the common interests must be made and *paid for* in peace. They cannot be postponed until danger arises without peril. Science and systematic preparation have usurped the former places of sentiment and enthusiasm in determining the issues of war. Wealth and natural resources are nothing but temptation to attack, if their reasonable and sufficient applications to the purposes of their defence is denied.

There is a further consideration to which I must refer.

While industry and enterprise in British lands in all quarters of the globe have been swelling the value and volume of our common sea commerce, war navies have been created and naval power has been developed by nations which thirty-five years ago were not—could not be—regarded as maritime Powers. Military stations and naval bases have been established by other Powers on oceans and seas not then but now of huge Imperial importance to us. All this is only natural, only what is reasonably to be expected, but nevertheless they are facts which, as regards British defence, must not, cannot be ignored.

These broad considerations concern not simply the United Kingdom, but all territories, all industries, all manufactures, all interests, and all peoples under our "one flag." They make up a union of common war risks against which general insurance must be paid and joint precautions taken. They can only be met with success by co-operation and joint action between the several parts of the Empire upon a settled system and a developed plan. I am referring chiefly to British sea trade, and for the present exclude other interests from comment. In doing so, however, it must be remarked that with certain exceptions—prominently that of India—the frontiers of our

Empire are practically sea frontiers. As a rule, the protection of our sea commerce is virtually the protection of our territories. Trade is territorial in its source and origin, though maritime in its main operations of exchange. I may mention in passing that the sea trade of India alone is about equal to that of Russia. It is worthy of attention that during 1851 the trade between the United Kingdom and India was officially stated at about 17 millions sterling; it is now some 86 millions a year. Thirty-five years ago the annual trade between Australia and India was in value only 150,000*l.*, it is now over three millions in value a year. The trade of the mother country has therefore five times, and that of Australia twenty times as much interest in the security and prosperity of India as they had thirty-five years ago. The territorial security of India is therefore of ever increasing importance to the industrial and commercial classes at home and in Australia. This remark can be shown to generally apply to almost all parts of the Empire as regards India and each other. I mention these facts to avoid a possible misconception that the protection of British trade and commerce is simply a question of securing sea communications. The sources of supply must be guarded as well as the freedom of flow secured. It is helpful to a real conception of Colonial growth to remember that Australasian trade alone at this moment equals that of the Empire of Russia. The total trade of that great Empire was in 1851 but two-thirds of the total trade of Canada to-day. The aggregate sea trade of the Colonies and dependencies at the present time exceeds by some 50 millions a year that of France and Russia together. These are great maritime Powers, but our Colonies and Dependencies, with a greater aggregate of sea interests to be protected, could not produce as many armed and efficiently manned boats as these two Powers can vessels of war.

All operations of war—by land or sea—may be resolved into three original elements; place, time, and force. The places necessary to occupy are fixed by geographical circumstances. The nature and strength of the forces required are determined by the character of the places to be taken or held. Time is the factor that rules the necessities which organization has to fulfil by the production at the right places, at the right time, the right force. This very elementary statement of course applies as much to certain latitudes and longitudes on oceans and seas as to territorial positions. Sea commerce passing over the water areas of the world is governed by physical laws. The direction, volume, and value of its constant ebb and flow, so to speak, is regulated by the laws of supply and demand. Now the whole operation of protecting our sea trade is covered by two main positions—

1st. The keeping in of the ships of the enemy that are in port when war breaks out.

2nd. Forcing all other vessels under a hostile flag off the sea, either into port or to the bottom.

The masking of hostile fleets by promptly placing, on the outbreak of war, off their war ports, the force necessary to keep them in

is an essential condition of safety of the commerce not only of the mother country but of each and all parts of the Empire. It is a joint necessity which must be provided for in order to secure reasonable safety for the whole. The fleet which keeps that of the enemy in port in one hemisphere is really protecting commerce in the other. The Colonies and dependencies for the security of their commerce will in war be as dependent as the United Kingdom on British naval power being equal and adapted to the discharge of that fundamental duty. While our commerce has been growing and foreign naval power has been developing, science has been changing the conditions of blockade: torpedo defence has benefitted the blockaded, while reliance on steam, which is reliance on coal, has diminished the staying power of ships engaged in blockade. Ships outside a port must keep up steam by emptying their bunkers up their funnels. Meantime these ships will be losing speed by the natural process of fouling of immersed surface. Thus, in order to coal and in order to clean, they must constantly leave the offing, and while away their place must be taken by others. The net result of such considerations, here only indicated, is that the growth of our sea trade has made efficient blockade more imperative, while science has made that operation more difficult and more costly. The magnitude of the sea interests of the Colonies and dependencies alone demand that the necessary means shall be sufficient and available for this purpose. Our outlying Empire with over 400 millions' worth of goods on the sea in a year is most directly concerned in the locking up of hostile fleets on the outbreak of war. Is it neither to share the cost of providing the means nor the duty and the honour of applying them to the purpose of securing its own safety? Our people at the Cape, in Canada, or Australia, are as patriotic as our fathers were when Jervis and Nelson, for the salvation of England, maintained famous blockades and fought their great sea fights. It is well to remember that the trade of British North America and South Africa together now is about what the trade of England was when St. Vincent was fought; and that the sea commerce of Australasia alone exceeds by tens of millions the sea trade of the United Kingdom when Nelson triumphed at Trafalgar.

Now as to the other branch of operations for the defence of sea trade. Though we may blockade hostile war ports, still some of the enemy's war fleet will probably be already at sea—steamers will escape from his mercantile ports or elsewhere armed for attack on our maritime or territorial interests. The main difference between blockade and the more extended operation of clearing the sea of hostile ships is—that in the one case our objective points are fixed points—the enemy's war ports—in the other they are ships with power of rapid locomotion. Sudden changes of position at sea and the probable absence of any clue whatever as to the direction and objects of those changes are the chief circumstances to be met by the defence arrangements of our Empire. The power of a fleet or vessel to attack or defend interests on the high seas is in proportion to its freedom; the limits of a steamer's freedom at any point on

the high seas are the coals in the bunkers *less the quantity* required to carry her to the nearest port where she can procure a fresh supply; her movements are ruled by coal-carrying capacity in relation to speed; speed is reduced by the fouling of immersed surface and by general wear and tear; loss of speed is equivalent to a reduction of coal-carrying capacity, and consequently to restriction on liberty of action.

As regards time and place, therefore, the freedom of a nation's fleet, squadron, or ship depends primarily upon the number and general distribution of national ports available for coaling, docking, and refitting. That freedom, however, is absolutely destroyed if such ports are not secured from attack wholly independently of seagoing ships. The first necessity, therefore, to the freedom of our fleet is the local and military defence of all British ports of importance at home and abroad. The chief measures to adopt in war to force hostile vessels off the sea is to employ sufficient means to make their access to their own mercantile ports, to which ocean steamers can resort, hazardous; and also to observe closely similar ports under a neutral flag.

What the naval and military organization of the Empire has to provide for, in order to secure the common commerce of each and all its parts, is the production of these various places on the outbreak of war, the right forces to do this varied work. The safety of that commerce will entirely depend upon the promptness with which it is done. The Empire's ability to do this work quickly is a question of co-operation between its several parts involving joint expenditure, common naval and military reserves of force and of supplies. These must be adapted to, and available for general service for the defence of our common sea trade; the interests of one are the interests of all; the duty of one is the duty of all.

The fullest freedom being secured for our seagoing forces, the next consideration is their distribution on the ocean; that must be mainly determined by the natural distribution of Imperial commerce on the high seas. The seagoing force required to protect a sea line of communication varies with its length. The longer the line, the greater the *number* of vessels necessary to protect it. The offensive or defensive *power* of the individual vessel is a tactical, but the *number* and class of vessels is a *strategical* problem—speed affects both. The importance of the line is determined by military considerations and by commercial facts. Since 1851, a process has been going on which must be noticed, having a commanding influence on the distribution of our naval force. In that year the United Kingdom drew about two-thirds of over-sea supply of wheat, wheat meal, and flour from European ports—the total amount of such food imported was some twenty-three million cwts.—the total quantity we now import is nearly treble what it was in 1851, and only about one-fifth of the whole now comes from European and Mediterranean ports. The sources of such supply have shifted across the Atlantic, and even to the other hemisphere. This extension of the food lines of the mother country is equivalent to a reduction of naval power available for other services

Food lines must be made safe whatever else happens, and for this special purpose a large proportion of our maritime means must be set apart. The increased length and increased reliance on our food lines over-sea necessitates an increase of naval means to ensure their safety, unless other naval duties are to be left undone.

But in 1851 only one-fortieth of such supply came from British possessions abroad while now the proportion is about one-fourth of that total.¹ Development of the infinite food-producing capabilities of our Empire beyond sea really corresponds to an increase of our defensive power. It may for the above reason be considered as part and parcel of the question how to secure a maximum of safety with a minimum of naval expenditure. Its solution lies in the increase of population in our own Colonies and the cultivation of our own lands over-sea. Co-operation between the mother country and the Colonies to produce this result would be of infinite advantage to both.

The relative values of different water districts of the world to the several parts of the Empire are shown in Diagram VII. It is only necessary to explain that the geographical limits of the ocean districts into which the diagram divides the world are as follows:—

North Seas Districts.—On the west by a line drawn from Dunkerque towards the Pole through Dover, the eastern boundary being the seaboard in the German Ocean and the Baltic Sea.

North-East Atlantic District is bounded on the west by 30° meridian W., on the south by the Equator, and on the east by the continuous seaboard from where the Equator strikes the West Coast of Africa to Dunkerque where it meets the limits of the North Seas.

North-West Atlantic District includes all the North Atlantic Ocean west of the 30° meridian.

South Atlantic District includes the seaboard of British South Africa with the Atlantic Ocean lying south of the Equator.

Indian Seas District takes in the water area enclosed by the continuous coast line from the north-east of British South Africa to Singapore, thence by a line, including Java, towards the South Pole and back to Delagoa Bay.

North Pacific District.—All the Pacific north of the Equator between the Indian Seas District and the American Continent.

South Pacific District.—All the Pacific south of the Equator between these limits.

These districts are also shown by dotted lines and seaboard on the map—the diagram and the map must be studied together. It is impossible now to attempt to deal with a great variety of considerations, but a careful examination of the diagram will present considerations, be it remembered, which determined the principles governing the distribution and the amount of naval and military force. I can do no more at present than indicate some of them, to show that some form of Imperial Federation for purposes of mutual defence is now essentially necessary for common safety.

At first sight it may be thought that the relative value of foreign

¹ The most remarkable and satisfactory feature of this change is the extraordinary increase of imports from India.

trade of the United Kingdom (A) in the North Sea and the two North Atlantic Districts entitles—for that sole reason—these districts to priority of protective precautions over all the others. It may also be thought from this first section of the diagram that the importance of our trade declines in value in the ratio of the distance of the districts from England.

From Section B it will be seen that the foreign trade of the outlying Empire is pretty equally distributed, except in the case of the South Atlantic and North Pacific.

Section C shows that the trade of the United Kingdom with the Empire over-sea is greatest with our seaboard in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, Section D shows interchange between our possessions abroad to be greater in the South Pacific district than in any other. When, however, the last section showing the whole distribution of British trade is examined, it would still seem as if British trade to foreign seaboard in the districts nearest England was of the greatest value.¹ That is quite true as regards a state of peace, but may not and is not likely to be true when we are engaged in war. This diagram shows the relative distribution of the Empire's trade in peace, and an outbreak of maritime war would entirely change the character of the peace distribution it illustrates.

Serious danger can only arise to our sea commerce from war with a Power having seaboard within the limits of the first three districts in the diagram, *i.e.*, the North Sea, the North-east Atlantic, and the North-west Atlantic. Such Powers are the largest contributors to the foreign trade of our Empire in those three districts. The effect of war would, before a gun was fired, reduce the foreign trade of the Empire in one or more of these particular districts, by the exact amount of previous interchange between the Empire and the Power or Powers thus becoming hostile. Thus, then, the relative value of near as compared with distant ocean districts will be wholly changed. By this cause alone the commercial value of the districts of the North Seas and North-east Atlantic, *vide A*, might fall at once to half that shown in the diagram; while that of the North-west Atlantic might fall as suddenly 90 per cent. Whatever maritime war may occur, the result must be an immediate increase of the relative values of the South Atlantic, Indian Seas, and North and South Pacific districts. These three last-named, the farthest from the United Kingdom, are, we must remember, separated from it by half the world, and communicate with it by three routes:—the Suez Canal, the Cape, and Cape Horn. As will be seen from the diagram, the internal trade of the Empire is greatest, but its external or foreign trade is smallest, in these three distant districts. Maritime war must accentuate the

¹ This diagram does not show accumulations in the various ocean districts. For example, the whole trade of the United Kingdom with all the world accumulates in the waters of the United Kingdom, thus raising the total value of the North-east Atlantic by the value of the trade with the United Kingdom of all other districts shown in the diagram. Nor does it show the accumulation of value produced by the commerce of one district passing over another on passage. For further explanation see my tables, &c., &c., "Naval Intelligence and Protection of Commerce in War."—Journal R.U.S.I., 1881.

commercial reliance of the Empire upon itself, because the loss caused by commercial interchange ceasing between belligerents will seek compensation elsewhere. South Africa, Australasia, Canada, and India are great and increasing factors in the trade operations of the world, and the seaboard of the last three command the waters of the other hemisphere, while South Africa commands one of the three roads which connect them with our own.

It is just because the Pacific and Indian Oceans are so important to us, and because they are so far removed from the mother country, that we must expect attack on our sea commerce will be first delivered there. Circumstances peculiar to this half of the world have a tendency to draw towards it in peace squadrons and war vessels of all the maritime Powers. There are international interests in Chinese and Japanese waters requiring their presence at all times. It is probable, therefore, that in an outbreak of war, more hostile cruisers will be at sea in the other hemisphere than in this: It is further to be observed that all other water areas of the world together do not present such geographical advantages for attack on our commerce as these three districts. The number of unappropriated islands, the restricted areas over which the world's commerce in those regions at present operates, offer many and great facilities for the establishment unobserved of coaling rendezvous and temporary bases for hostile ships. Our fellow citizens in Australasia appear to be fully alive to this fact. We and they are too prone to think that the danger can be averted by the simple and cheap process of hoisting the Union Jack on a pole on an indefinite number of islands. It is not, however, the enthusiasm which hoists our own flag in peace that will secure our safety on any sea in war, but the possession of organized defensive war power capable, when the time of trouble comes, of promptly pulling hostile flags down.

By whom and how is that necessary power to be created and maintained? That is really the whole question of Imperial Federation for defence—it is one only to be settled by Home and Colonial statesmen, backed by enlightened public opinion throughout the Empire. We here are only concerned with the strategical naval and military aspects of the Empire's defence. With the civil arrangements necessary to provide the means required for common security we have nothing to do. I would, however, venture once more to repeat my own belief, expressed on many occasions here and elsewhere during the last eighteen years, it is this: that more means are likely to be provided, and that some basis of joint action would probably be settled, if responsible ministers of Her Majesty's Home and Colonial Governments were brought together in one room and round one table, in order to confer with the responsible military and naval authorities, as to what is necessary to be mutually done for the security of our common interests in war.

As will be seen by a careful study of the last section of Diagram VII, the aggregate yearly value of the trade of our Colonies and Dependencies in the South Pacific is nearly double the total annual trade of the United Kingdom in those waters. Taking annual value of com-

merce as a standard, the Colonies and Dependencies are very much more concerned in the safety of the South Pacific districts than the United Kingdom; deficiency in the naval and military means required to protect the trade in the South Pacific would inflict more grievous loss on our fellow-citizens in Australasia than on us. It is a question for them, for Canada, and for us conjointly to determine how the ever-increasing British trade in the Pacific is to be provided with naval and military protection. Most of the chief ports of Australasia are, by local means, secured against sea attack, and thus they are in striking contrast with some of our great commercial ports at home. The money some of these Colonies have spent, the armaments they have provided, and the local forces they maintain, are solid contributions to the freedom of our squadron in the South Pacific. That squadron may be sufficient for the purposes of peace; but can Australasia long remain satisfied with the existing arrangement, which places the reserve of ships, men, ordnance, and ammunition in the North Atlantic, and thus, at the very moment the South Pacific sorely needs them on the spot, they will be at the other side of the world?

The movable reserves of matériel and personnel in Great Britain for use in war are for general service of the Empire, and when distributed and despatched from home to the various stations, the Pacific—owing to its distance—will be the last to receive reinforcement. The delay will thus be greatest where the combined sea interests of Colonies and Dependencies are greatest, and where prompt action is most urgent.

As a short way of supplementing these remarks, I point to Diagram VIII, comparing the trade and revenue of Australasia with that of other Powers having seaboard only in the Pacific Ocean. It is to be remembered that the naval war power referred to in the margin and the war dockyards on which it rests have come into being since 1851. In the interval which has elapsed our Empire, with the greatest stake in the North and South Pacific, has done least to make the power necessary for its protection locally self-supporting in war. Does anybody think—can anybody believe, that a defensive system adapted to the ancient necessities of an island can be effective when that island has grown into an Empire and overspread the world? Those who say off-hand it is so, let them make assurance doubly sure that they are right. Let those who doubt enquire more, and it is the duty of every one who does not think so to do what in him lies to bring about a development of our naval and military arrangements adapted to the necessities of our growth.

I must now briefly and broadly refer to—

Demands of a Naval and Military Character necessitated by Growth.

Seeing the enormous extent of geographical, strategical, constitutional, commercial, and naval and military ground the whole question covers, it will be obviously impossible here to do more than faintly indicate its salient features. To attempt a detailed survey in the time would be useless if not absurd. Each ocean district and our territories they include have varying characteristics, influencing naval

and military considerations. I shall now only attempt to touch lightly upon main principles of general application, and try and illustrate them by reference to the Pacific and Indian Seas.

For clearness of such illustration we will treat the Indian Seas district as a great quadrilateral; its north side being chiefly British territory, and its corners commanded by Aden, the Cape, King George's Sound, and Singapore, the first two dominating two of the three routes connecting one hemisphere with the other. Likewise let us regard the Pacific Ocean as another parallelogram with a huge preponderating proportion of our territory in the south. King George's Sound, Port Hamilton, Vancouver, and Cape Horn at its corners, and commanded by Sydney, Vancouver, Port Hamilton, and the Falkland Islands, the latter position dominating the third water route from the other hemisphere to this. To make divisions so enormous may appear impractical, but it must be remembered that science has and is overcoming the obstacles of distance in the practical work of the world; that our trade is with all the world, and that the helpless ships we must arrange to protect in war do from 70 to 80 per cent. of the carrying of the world's trade, and that the British sea trade to be guarded is, roughly speaking, in value alone *one-third* that of the whole world's interchange by land and sea. That is the general result of our growth, and if we are to meet the naval and military demands of growth we must not be frightened by their geographical dimensions.

Taking, then, these two great quadrilaterals, there are right places and there will be times when the defensive organization of the Empire must produce the right forces, both naval and military, for the defence of our interests within them. It must not only get the forces there promptly, but be able to sustain them so long as may be required. It will be understood that I now limit my remarks to considerations respecting the naval protection of the high seas and the military security of naval bases, they only refer to the ocean quadrilateral, not to the Indian territories. These considerations I group under three heads:—

War ships.
Garrisons, &c.
Ordnance and stores.

Taking these in reverse order, let us glance at the necessities of defence in these quadrilaterals in war. It is only by a careful examination of such facts we can arrive at a conclusion as to whether Federation for Defence is necessary for common safety, and if so on what principle should it be based. Where and how are we to begin?

Ordnance and Stores.

For powder and shot, guns and gun-carriages, and all ordnance stores, our fleet and garrison depend on Woolwich and Elswick.¹ Every

¹ The resources of Indian establishments can hardly be held to be in excess of the territorial requirements of India, and therefore lie outside the question of supply of the maritime wants.

shot and cartridge used by us in these two great areas must be replaced from thence. British forces in Australasia, a garrison at Port Hamilton, or our frigates off the Horn, at present must rely for these things on workshops on the Tyne and on the Thames. When an extra amount is wanted in the Pacific it will also be wanted in the Atlantic. Pressure, therefore, from all quarters of the world on the outbreak of war will be brought to bear on these establishments simultaneously.

Next comes the question of transport. Munitions of war cannot be exposed to risk of capture or destruction so long as hostile ships are at sea. Precautions must be taken to ensure the sea transit of war stores, hence they must either be escorted by war-ships or sent unconvoyed by the very fastest merchant steamers. If escorted by war-ships, naval force must be reduced elsewhere in order to furnish convoys. In this case the transports must adopt the speed of the convoys, but if the fastest war-ships are so employed, then the general protection of commerce must be left to the slower war-ships. If, however, slow war-vessels furnish the escort, then time will be lost in the delivery of stores. Supposing we rely upon speed without escort; then we are taking from our merchant marine a proportionate part of its best element of safety—speed—and so forcing an increased amount of food and other freights into slower ships, and adding to the risk of capture.

There is an economical question involved even in peace by the facts here referred to. To the cost of production must be added the cost of delivery—the further the destination from the factory the greater the expense. These considerations point more or less all one way, and may be shortly summed up by saying that the artillery requirements of the British positions, maritime and territorial, would be more certainly, promptly, and perhaps more economically met by our having a factory for production of war *matériel* in the Pacific. Australasia, and the western provinces of Canada both offering natural resources necessary.¹

Such extension of local power of producing war *matériel*, whether situate in Australasia or Western Canada, would be in peace of mutual advantage to us and the Colony in which established;² and to the whole Empire a source of incalculable strength in war. Self support of supply of war stores in the Pacific quadrilateral appears to be a first principle on which arrangements for Imperial Federation for defence should be based. It is simply a question of business-like practical co-operation between the Government of Her Majesty at home, and Her Majesty's Government in one or other of these

¹ *Vide* my remarks in "Defence of Great and Greater Britain," in 1880. (Stanford.)

² The overcrowding of the skilled labour market at home is an increasing economic difficulty. The attraction of the surplus of the old country to the mineral resources of the new, under our own flag, could not but be beneficial were the principle applied of Government contracts to a private firm, such as a Pacific Elswick. Doubtless many contracts for war *matériel* made by foreign Pacific Powers would fall into its hands, instead of, as now, German, &c., firms in Europe.

Colonies. Proximity to the Indian seas seems to point rather towards Australasia than Canada as the site for such an establishment. Great things must have small beginnings, and the real danger is delay. If it is argued that this is too big a business to undertake, the reply is the business to be done in war is bigger. Canada has recently made a small advance in this direction by the establishment of a Government cartridge factory in Quebec; and when trouble came in the north-west, this infant factory turned out in "two months over one and a half million ball cartridges."¹

Garrisons, &c.

Beyond the defended seaports of Australasia and the partially secured ports of India and of Canada, there are many others in these two great quadrilaterals of infinite importance to our fleet in war. About the most dangerous programme for any nation to adopt would be that which would provide for naval bases, armaments, and works, but which did not provide either the number of trained men necessary or the organization required to ensure their being at their posts when wanted. The defence of such ports involves, of course, three arms—the torpedo, the gun, and the rifle. The greater the advance in science, the greater the skill required in the use of weapons. Skill is a matter of training and experience; both cost money and time. If the many isolated ports in these two great areas, and elsewhere, upon which the freedom of our fleet depends have not, on the outbreak of war, the artillery, torpedo, and small-arm force required, the fact of their having works and armament only adds to naval danger. That danger can only be met by the expenditure in peace of money and time for the maintenance and training of the force required to garrison and defend the keys of our sea empire in war. What proportion of such forces may be active or reserve is a question of detail; that there shall be such forces and that they shall be at their posts when wanted is a principle vital to the security of the commerce of the Empire.

The first point is to get the men.

Second, to train them.

Third, that they shall be available for service *where* wanted, and when wanted.

These three conditions bring us to considerations as to the distribution and the characteristics of the population of the Empire. Diagram IV shows numerical distribution,² roughly as follows: $\frac{1}{7}$ of the whole is in the United Kingdom, $\frac{6}{7}$ being beyond sea. Of the population of the outlying Empire $\frac{2}{3}$ of the total is located in the Dependencies, only $\frac{1}{3}$ is in the Colonies. As regards the Dependencies, the table at the foot of Diagram I shows that out of a total of 206 millions, 200 millions are in India; the 6 millions

¹ *Vide* Annual Report, Militia and Defence Canadian Blue Book, 1886.

² The address of the President, Sir Rawson Rawson, before the Statistical Society, 1884, will be found, by those not already acquainted with it, an invaluable and admirable guide to statistical information respecting British and Foreign Colonies.

being distributed amongst the West Indies, West Coast of Africa, and isolated possessions in various other parts of the world. Comparing the tables in Diagrams I, II, and IV, it will be seen how enormous is the number to the north of the Indian Seas quadrilateral, and how very few and far between are the populations of the Colonies in the South Pacific, or of Western Canada in the north.¹ But to whatever extent the huge numerical strength of Indian population might or could be used to furnish garrisons where necessary in the Pacific or Indian Seas, the question of artillery and torpedo service is not a question of numbers but of natural characteristics. It needs no argument, it is an obvious fact, that these arms demand, as a rule, the best talents and peculiar qualities of our own race. Assuming that such infantry force as it may be necessary to distribute for the defence of naval bases and ports in the Indian Seas and Pacific might possibly be raised in India,² the question of artillery and torpedo corps remains for consideration.

Where a naval base or coaling station is situated in our Colonies, local population offer the raw material for creating torpedo or artillery corps. At such places it is simply a question of numbers, inducements, and training. I will not stop to examine to what extent the means thus at hand have been made use of at the chief ports of Australasia or Western Canada. The important consideration is the provision for artillery and torpedo service at ports thousands of miles away from either of these seaboard, and where our own race cannot be or is not localized in sufficient numbers to furnish on the spot such corps. It may be accepted as a first principle of British sea defence that there must be an artillery and a torpedo corps and infantry available for general service at coaling ports, &c., throughout the Empire, and sufficiently strong for their needs. If this principle be not fully satisfied by the arrangements of the Empire for its defence, it is not one part of that Empire that will suffer alone, but all. It is a common necessity for the security of our common commerce. In the safety of the Pacific and Indian quadrilaterals, the commerce of our Colonies and Dependencies is first and chiefly concerned. Comparing Home and Colonial populations to areas, as shown in Diagrams II and III, it is evident the United Kingdom must be the chief recruiting ground for the rank and file of such corps. It does not follow that for the defence of our ports in the Pacific and Indian Seas this Island in the Atlantic is a suitable position for trained reserves for service in the Pacific. The argument as to time and transport referred to in the case of war stores here points again to Australasia and Western Canada as the proper situation for training schools and depôts of forces intended for such service in those seas. The arrangements for the

¹ The population of British Columbia is not at present 50,000.

² This is merely assumed, not by any means intended to be asserted. There are many and great objections, and very wide differences of opinion on this point have been expressed by eminent Indian authorities. Reference to lectures, 1869-1871-1877-1878-1881, Chap. 2 and 3, "Defence of Great and Greater Britain," also "Use and Application of Marine Forces: Past, Present, and Future," Journal, 1883, will explain the views I hold as to garrisons for coaling stations.

maintenance of such a force involves joint action and co-operation between the mother country and the Colonies in order to bridge over the chasm in the system of the Empire's defence which purely local forces cannot fill. If it be said when war comes there will be plenty of Volunteers in the Colonies and at Home for general service abroad, I think the answer is—there will be thousands ready to join the Army in the field, but probably a pinnace would hold all the volunteer gunners, or torpedoists, or infantry that would earnestly desire to go to the Falklands, Diego Garcia, Port Hamilton, or Fiji. We cannot trust the keys of security of a thousand millions of sea commerce to patriotic sentiment; its safety in war will depend upon an organized defensive system.

To examine this military kernel of the naval nut would now take too long. The permanent strength of the artillery and torpedo corps necessary for our naval security is not so very great, but for reasons I gave in a lecture here "On the Use and Application of Marine Forces," its organization, I venture to think, would require to be very elastic, and capable of absorbing in itself Colonial as well as home resources.

Lastly, its Colonial depôts should keep touch with each other, with their outlying detachments in dependencies, and with headquarters in the mother country, forming one force, circulating by periodic reliefs, and interchangeable between the Colonies, the Dependencies, and the mother country, by a tour of duty round the world.

The efficient maintenance of some such force suggests itself as an imperative necessity of our growth, in the satisfying of which all parts of our sea empire are equally concerned. The establishment of depôts and training schools, and the maintenance of a nucleus of a force available for general service at our out-ports in the Pacific and Indian Seas is surely not more than obvious necessity demands. Some 35,000,000 tons of shipping annually entering and clearing our ports in that water area illustrates the interest the Colonies and Dependencies alone have in their defence. In view of the magnitude of such port-interests, Imperial Federation, naval and military, asks for that necessary, business-like co-operation of the mother country and the Colonies which can alone provide and maintain military guarantees for their security in war, for the common interests and the common good.

War Vessels.

To do full justice to this branch of the subject would require very lengthy consideration. It is only possible now to sketch roughly its boldest features.

Both as to numerical strength and description of vessels, requirements of the police duties of our fleet in the other hemisphere in peace, are wholly different from those to be fulfilled in war. It would be a waste of power and of money to employ in peace ocean cruisers to discharge the minor but necessary duties of superintending the interests of British trade at the mouths of rivers, and at the multitude of small ports in the Pacific and Indian Seas.

The Officers and men employed in such duties in peace are available of course for service on the ocean in war, but the vessels are not. If therefore the vessels suitable for ocean service in the Pacific are held in reserve in our home ports in the Atlantic the outbreak of war will lock up in vessels which cannot keep the sea, a very large proportion of naval personnel in the Pacific. War cruisers dispatched from home must, during hostilities, have full complements of Officers and men, and thus the arrival of such vessels in the Pacific some two months after they are required will do nothing at all to make available for ocean service the naval force locked up in our Pacific ports. The net result of this system would be, that while the mother country puts with naval reserves in order to dispatch war cruisers to the Pacific, an equivalent portion of the regular naval forces will remain bottled up in our ports in that ocean district, because they have no ships. On the outbreak of war, the simultaneous and prompt conversion of our naval arrangements from a peace to a war footing will be of the utmost consequence to our commerce in every ocean district of the world. The commerce of foreign Powers is so small compared to our own, that we have practically "to police" international trade in peace, at a sacrifice of naval efficiency for war. Hence it is that in distant seas foreign squadrons are more ready and are better adapted to purposes of sea attack than are ours for sea defence. It is just as much in the interests of the trade of our Colonies and Dependencies as it is the mother country's, that this necessary police work should be done. It is equally their interest that every precaution should be taken to ensure that what adds to commercial prosperity in peace shall not be a fruitful cause of the absence of adequate protection for our common sea trade in war. Here, again, co-operation is needed to secure that end, and at Colonial ports in the Pacific should ocean cruisers be held ready in reserve for war service in those seas.

As to reserves of seamen, it is on the United Kingdom and the Atlantic provinces of Canada the Empire must, for many a day to come, chiefly rely. But it is to be remembered that science is increasing the demand for seagoing, seakeeping fighting ships, while reducing the number of men required to fight them.

Such, then, would be the chief requisitions of a naval and military character made by the Empire's growth. The underlying principle common to all is a recognition of the practical difficulty of providing protection for our Empire's interests in the other hemisphere by the single-handed efforts of the population and resources of our Island in this. The difficulties are increasing, and the need for honestly facing them is very great. They can only be met by combining the resources under our flag by a comprehensive system "for the maintenance of common interests and the organized defence of common rights."¹ No such system on a settled basis is possible without co-operation between the mother country and the Colonies. Without a defined and arranged basis of joint action, no settled system can exist

¹ *Vide* 4th article of Declaration by the Imperial Federation League. Central office, 43, St. Margaret's Offices, Victoria Street, London, S.W. This League has branches throughout the Empire.

and no plan for effectual defence can be carried out. The mother country and the Colonies have really now to chose between some form of Federation for mutual defence, or reaping with the Dependencies a harvest of difficulties and dangers, if not great disasters, in war.

What Imperial Federation, naval and military, really means is not "spread-eagleism;" not a declaration of "defiance" to the world; but business-like arrangements between the Colonies and the mother country for the discharge of the responsibilities and the duties of "defence." It is a duty we all owe not only to ourselves but to the two hundred millions of people in the Dependencies, for whose present interests and future safety we are each and all concerned.

To some, I fear, it will be disappointing that more has not been said in respect of Home and Colonial military forces being amalgamated for service in the field. Looking, however, (Diagram IV) at the present distribution of population, and to the rates of wages at home and in the Colonies, I find myself driven to the following conclusions:—

That for some time to come no such portion of the populations as could add appreciable numerical strength to a British army in the field can be withdrawn from the Colonies for service in a prolonged campaign. The cost to the Colonies, owing to the necessarily high scale of soldier's pay, would be out of all proportion to the force produced in the field. Practical difficulties might arise from the fact that men sent from the Colonies received more pay than the men sent from home, though doing precisely the same duty. It is by no means certain that when a British army has to take the field, Colonial forces may not have plenty of work to do to defend interests near their homes, or to seize and hold naval bases established by an enemy in the Pacific or Indian Seas.

The amalgamation of Home and Colonial forces for *field* service does not urgently call for co-operation between Home and Colonial Governments. Preparation for the coming time when present relative economic conditions have somewhat changed can be by other means sufficiently met. Such means may be described in a few words. By offering every possible facility, by breaking down every bar or hindrance or custom which tends to prevent or obstruct our fellow subjects in the Colonies from having the same opportunities and advantages of entering and advancing in the public services of the Crown, be they naval, military, or civil, which we at home enjoy. Further by a readiness to facilitate in every possible way the training of field forces in our Colonies, and at all times when offered assistance in the field by Colonial Governments to accept such proposals with prompt gratitude where and whenever possible.

Such are the germs which, if planted now, will produce the ripe fruit, in the form of Colonial field forces, in due time. That time will be hastened as population is attracted from Great Britain to the Colonies, and their great areas of fertile lands now lying waste are peopled and cultivated by our own kith and kin.

Numerical strength for the British Army for field service must be drawn from the United Kingdom and the Dependencies, not sought

for in the Colonies. Officers and non-commissioned officers of Colonial forces should, however, be employed where possible with the army whenever and wherever it takes the field.

Conclusion.

It has not been possible to do more than indicate some broad principles, and illustrate them by reference to general naval and military requirements of large areas. They cover, however, a variety of special considerations which merit the greatest attention. I can now only briefly refer to one.

Since 1851 the stream of interchange between this side of the world and the other has been turned into a new channel. The Suez Canal has complicated our maritime position, and while giving us certain military advantages—so long as we can hold our own at sea—it has added to military responsibility in supporting the operations of our fleet. I would point out that such weight as may attach to my observations on ordnance and garrisons, and war vessels for the Pacific and Indian Seas, is not in the least diminished by the assumption that the Suez Canal will always be open to us in war. If, however, the probability or the possibility of the canal being closed to us be admitted, the facts come home to the mind with accumulated force. The possibility of such an occurrence it is not reasonable wholly to ignore. The consequences to maritime security in the other hemisphere will depend upon how far we have developed to an adequate extent the resources the Empire possesses in the Pacific. The results to our position in India will be wholly determined by the precautions we have taken to provide for the most rapid and ready transit of troops by alternative routes.

The Empire's answer to a "blocked" Suez Canal has been given by Canada. The influence which the "Canadian Pacific" can exercise on our naval and military position in the far East is immense. On this point I have said so much during past years that it is only now necessary to add a few words.

Now that the railway *has* been built, the facilities it offers as a means of reinforcing India sooner and more certainly than by the Cape are generally understood. Successive Ministers holding the seals of the Colonial Office have publicly testified within the last few months to the opportunities and advantages to the whole Empire this alternative route presents. Under our existing arrangement, however, it appears that our naval and military policy to provide for our common safety must be influenced by, if not subordinated to, the department of the Post Office. There never was a stronger proof that some sort of Federation for defence is necessary to enable naval and military authority to develop in peace a settled plan for the defence of our Empire in war. When that war comes we surely shall think more of the speed and certainty with which we can throw troops into India than of the past profits made on our own letters by the office in St. Martin's-le-Grand.

As regards the sea extension of the Canadian Pacific by subsidizing

a powerful line of steamers to join Port Moody with India, via Hong Kong, and with Australasia, via Fiji—the facts as to the saving of time in communication with Hong Kong, India, and Australasia, via Vancouver, are before the public, and need no comment here. The advantages that route offers as a military road do require some special remarks.

In the first place, whether the Suez Canal be open or closed to us in war, troops *en route* to the East must pass along and close to the Atlantic sea-face of Europe. If the canal is open, the line of route will continue along the major axis of what is practically a European lake. Just in proportion to the nearness of our sea-lines to hostile or to neutral ports, so are its dangers. The more numerous the nationalities possessing commercial or war ports, the greater, under the provisions of international law, are the facilities afforded to our enemies' cruizers for coaling and supplies. Their original power of continuous attack on our sea-lines is greatest where the war or commercial resources of sea-boards are most developed, and the nationality of such ports is most varied. The North-east Atlantic district presents to us the maximum of these dangers.

For these and for other reasons a military transport steaming from Liverpool or Galway to Halifax, north of Ireland, would not be exposed to the same risks in war as crossing the Bay to Gibraltar or passing from Gibraltar to Port Said. The remarks made as to the transport of munitions of war during hostilities applies with tenfold force in the case of troops. So far, then, the route from here to the Atlantic terminus of the Canadian Pacific line offers, as regards security, superior advantages to all others during any war with a European Power. There are more fast ocean merchant steamers employed in the lines between the mother country and North America than on any other. It is from that quarter of the globe we must wholly rely for wheat in the event of a blocked Suez Canal or other circumstances cutting off our Indian supply. The safety of our food supply in war will largely depend upon the speed of the vessels available to carry it. The safety of troopers will be more or less due to the same cause. The adoption of the Canadian Pacific route would not, therefore, dislocate our food supply arrangements. The fast ocean steamer which landed troops at Halifax or Quebec could take a return freight of wheat there, or in the neighbourhood. On the other hand, trusting to the Cape route alone as the *one alternative* military road to India, must deprive the North-west Atlantic service of a very large proportion of its best and fastest steamers at the supreme moment when for national reasons they will be most required there.

Turning now to the North Pacific—if the Sandwich Islands coal-stores are watched—the period of a fast steamer's danger, running from Vancouver to Hong Kong, or to Fiji, is limited to the few hundred miles measured from the terminal point at both ends of the lines. There are practically no bases which would enable steamers without great staying powers keeping the sea anywhere over more than about half of the line. The expanse of water is so vast that by a slight but constant variation of the course of our steamers, we

could reduce the likelihood of a hostile vessel of equal speed and staying power falling in with our steamers to the merest chance.

Besides purely military considerations in respect of India, and others specially relating to communication in war with Australia, there is another standpoint from which the question of establishing *new* lines of powerful steamers from Vancouver's to Hong Kong and Australasia should be regarded. In the first place the establishment of such a line would naturally and at private expense develop means of naval repair and refit in the waters of British Columbia. These would be available to Her Majesty's ships in war. In the next place it is material we should place ourselves in a position to promptly reinforce naval forces on the American side of the North Pacific, as well as in China and Australasian waters. If war cruisers are held in reserve at Vancouver's, as well as at Hong Kong and an Australasian port, this can be done provided we have the necessary high speed steamers to "mobilize" the naval *personnel* on the spot. It cannot be done if we have not localized lines of such steamers connecting Vancouver with Hong Kong, and Australasia. They would enable us to distribute Officers and seamen to war cruisers at such places, and to supplement them with Naval Reserve, drawn from the mother country or Eastern Canada in a few days.

If these conditions be fairly considered side by side with the advantages the Canadian Pacific route offers as to time, the gravity of the Imperial question referred to a departmental committee will be more fully understood.

From the time of Sir Francis Drake to that of Sir John Franklin, England spent millions of money and sacrificed freely some of her noblest sons in the vain hope of discovering for her own advantage a natural north-west passage.

Steam and engineering science, the foresight of Canadian statesmen, and the resources of the Canadian people, have given to England and the Empire all the advantages for common defence which nature denied.

Drake, three centuries ago, failing to find it, sailed from the neighbourhood of British Columbia, eastward, on the famous voyage round the world. It is quaintly told by the historian that before departing from the American continent he set up a plate nailed to a "great faire post," whereon he engraved the name of Queen Elizabeth, as a monument of "our being there," as also of Her Majesty's "right and title to the same." In our own time the descendants of the men who with Drake encompassed the world, and defeated and destroyed the "Great Armada," were able to telegraph from these same regions to another Queen of England that they had set up a great iron way which joined two oceans, "as a monument of their being there," as also "Her Majesty's right and title to the same."

After all the lives and treasure we have thrown away in trying to find a road to the Pacific through Arctic ice, are the advantages which Canada offers for our common defence to be weighed against some departmental difficulty concerning a two-penny halfpenny stamp? No stronger argument than this is it possible to produce

in favour of Imperial Federation for Defence:—the want of some executive and administrative machinery which would raise an Empire's safety above the level of political and local party strife, and make continuity of naval and military arrangements for the defence of the Empire possible, and secure the development of a settled plan.

Lastly, I produce Table IX, comparing aggregates of our Colonial Empire with the United States. The lessons it teaches are plain and simple. Though the people of the United States love peace as much as the Colonies and we ourselves, they maintain a regular naval and military force as a ready nucleus in case of war. With a revenue only double the aggregate revenues of our self-governing Colonies, the United States spend thirteen times as much on preparation for war as our whole Colonial Empire. The sea trade of the whole United States in annual value is only some 75 per cent. in excess of the aggregate trade of British self-governed Colonies alone. Only a small proportion of the trade of the States is carried in American bottoms, most of their ocean-carrying business and practically all that of British Colonies is carried by British ships. When we are at war every British ship will be an object for attack. The States, however, with such small mercantile marine interests, spend over 3,000,000*l.* a year on naval precautions. On a seagoing force the British Colonies spend nothing at all. If the cost of naval volunteers here and there in the Colonies can be considered as "naval expenditure," in that case the last remark must be corrected by stating that the United States spend seventy-five times as much on preparations for maritime war as all our Colonies put together!

These are facts very germane indeed to the question of Imperial Federation for Defence, but upon them I can here offer no further remarks.

The Colonies showed the old spirit when across the waves our fathers ruled came offers of help and Colonial Volunteers to the Soudan. The native Princes of India then, and not for the first time, gave proof that, though not of the same race, they were swayed by the same sentiments. The movement of Indian Forces to the Mediterranean and the Nile illustrates, however, not merely the force of sentiment, but the value and possible extension of outlying organized power. If science has increased and is increasing difficulties to Old England and her offspring, it also offers to her and to her children as a united Empire the means of escape from them if we will.

We have ceased to wonder that cricket matches are arranged by telegraph between Australia and England, or rifle matches fixed between the marksmen of Canada and marksmen at home. It comes in the natural course of daily events that very soon after Canadians score "bulls'-eyes" at Wimbledon, the Australians bowl us out at Lord's. Are the gifts of science to be only applied for purposes of the cricket field and rifle range? Are they to remain neglected and unused for want of such an Imperial system as can combine British power for British protection in war?

I commenced this paper by illustrating growth of commerce and

of population, growth of shipping and of revenue. I cannot close without drawing attention to another sort of growth—the growth of war.

At the opening ceremony of the Great International Exhibition, 1851, a thanksgiving was offered up “that nations do not lift up the sword against each other, nor learn war any more.” This expressed the hope of the civilized world in those days. Now, in the thirty-five years which have since elapsed there has been twice as much bloodshed, and more than double the money spent in war by civilized Powers than during the sixty-five years which preceded the offering up of that thanksgiving. Such is the teaching of a century. Such the vanity of human hopes.

However, therefore, we may earnestly desire peace, however much we may lament the growth of war, it is time the citizens of our “great world State” should band themselves together by Imperial Federation for Defence, if they are determined to preserve, not merely by sentiment but by sacrifice and system—that which our fathers won for us—an Empire and the freedom of the sea.

H.R.H. the DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE: Your Royal Highness, my lords, ladies, and gentlemen, it now becomes my duty, as having occupied the chair on this occasion, in the name of this large assembly to thank the gallant Officer for the very interesting and valuable lecture that he has given us this afternoon. There is only one point in which I venture a little to differ in the way he has put this question. He has put his scheme before you as for a case of war—but I should rather put it as a case for peace. What he has demanded is in the interests of peace; what he asks for is really an assurance against war. I am one of those who contend that if countries such as we have heard represented to-day are prepared to meet emergencies, war is the last thing that will probably take place. On that ground I consider that instead of being a warlike, this has been an extremely peaceful lecture—a lecture which ought to open the eyes of this country and make us feel that we have an enormous Empire to defend—an Empire which I do not suppose anyone—certainly no one present—would wish to see diminished one single iota. The fact of our having a great Colonial Exhibition here this year seems to me to render what we have heard just now extremely appropriate. It so happens that there are a great many of our friends from the Colonies who are assembled in this great metropolis at this present time, and I am persuaded that they are quite as English and as old-fashioned in their feeling as any one of us. The question of federation is of course an enormous one, and it is one of the most difficult questions of the day. It is a question that perhaps will never be settled in my lifetime, but we are all tending towards it, and I do not believe there is anything more likely to bring it about than this mutual feeling of necessity of mutual defence which has been so ably advocated on the present occasion. The first point in all these questions is security. Believe me, gentlemen, if you live in security you can do anything you like—whether it is commerce or trade or manufacture, all these large and enormous questions are only to be conducted when you feel secure. Security lies at the bottom of the whole of these subjects, and if therefore we can provide a great security not only for our home arrangements but for our great Indian and Colonial Empire, I feel persuaded that that will do more towards federation than any other consideration that can be brought forward. Then comes the difficulty in all these matters, namely, the matter of means. We can find the men, we can build the ships, but we must have the means to do so, and unless we have the means to do so it is impossible to make any arrangements whatever. Now there arises the great difficulty. Taxation is a very inconvenient subject to talk about. Whether you talk of it at home or whether you talk of it in the Colonies everybody of course is anxious to point out that all these things may be deferred in order to make it less uncomfortable for

the pockets of the taxpayers at the present moment. That really is the question—there is more in that than in anything else. If you are prepared to do anything in regard to the subject which has now been so ably brought before us it must cost money, and without money it cannot be done. Therefore if you, or if the country—for I do not doubt that everybody here is quite prepared to do it—if the country, and not only our home country, but if the Colonies and other portions of the Empire are not prepared to go to the expense of these preparations, it is useless to think of them at all. The only way to encourage this is to make every man feel that it is his interest to insure his property, whatever it may be; and it is really, after all, a great question of insurance. I was not aware exactly what line of argument the lecturer was about to use, and therefore you will hardly expect me to go into any details. I will also further remark, that I understand there is to be another lecture on this subject later on, and therefore I would suggest that there should not be any discussion to-day. I hope, therefore, I shall have expressed your views when I have thanked our gallant friend Captain Colomb for the very able manner in which he has brought this subject forward, and perhaps the few remarks that I have made will make you all think of the really important points which he has brought to our notice.

EMPIRE




GROWTH.

TABLE No. 6.

Revenues of the United Kingdom, 1851 to 1886, and now.

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Year	Population
1851	9,538,597
1856	206,701,135
1861	216,239,732
1866	36,325,115
1871	252,564,847

The figure of the Diagram are for Revenues which express millions of £ in the United Kingdom and cleared in the case of the Colonies under the head of Population. Six illustrations by diagram on this scale, or the Revenues of the Colonies in the case in 1851 to six millions, they

J. C. R. COLOMB,
Capt late R.M.A.

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COLONIES 1884-5.

TABLE No. 2.

Population. Trade. Shipping. Revenue. Millions.

Category	Value (Millions)
Population	9
Trade	26
Shipping	37
Revenue	176

Population.	Trade.	One Year's	
		Shipping Entered & Cleared	Revenue.
4,504,319	£ 45,749,966	Tons. 9,211,025	£ 7,080,115
3,231,783	118,573,876	15,381,853	22,297,790
1,802,495*	12,118,920	1,988,434	8,144,528
9,538,597	176,442,762	26,581,312	37,522,433

* Population Bechuana Land not included.

UNITED KINGDOM 1884-5.

TABLE No. 3.

Area. Population. Trade. Shipping. Revenue. Millions.

Category	Value (Millions)
Area	36
Population	64
Trade	92
Shipping	644
Revenue	644

Area.	Population.	Trade.	One Year's	
			Shipping Entered & Cleared.	Revenue.
Square Miles. 120,757	36,325,115	£ 644,769,249	Tons. 64,272,522	£ 92,640,000

DEPENDENCIES 1851.

TABLE No. 5.

Millions.

Category	One Year's		
	Trade.	Shipping Entered & Cleared.	Revenue.
55	34,076,037	1,561,347	27,625,360
93	3,804,327	504,341	429,701
717	9,069,646	1,075,190	730,469
669	781,190	155,338	47,837
823	3,082,047	2,733,653	537,950
357	50,813,247	5,029,869	29,371,317

UNITED KINGDOM 1851.

Millions.

Category	Population.	One Year's	
		Trade.	Shipping Entered & Cleared.
UNITED KINGDOM	27,595,388	324,893,307	14,505,064
		£	Tons. 57,964,464




TABLE No. 3.

Revenue. Millions.
644

EMPIRE 1884-5.

TABLE No. 4.

Trade, Millions.
1,079

Colonies thus 
 Dependencies 
 United Kingdom 

Area.

Population.

Shipping.

Revenue.

Colonies

Dependencies

United Kingdom

	Area.	Population.	One Year's		
			Trade.	Shipping Entered & Cleared.	Revenue.
	Square Miles.		£	Tons.	£
COLONIES	7,106,174	9,538,597	176,442,762	26,581,312	37,522,433
DEPENDENCIES	1,335,989	206,701,135	257,895,322	51,373,727	77,339,178
TOTAL BEYOND SEA	8,442,163	216,239,732	434,338,084	77,955,039	114,861,611
UNITED KINGDOM	120,757	36,325,115	644,763,249	64,272,522	92,640,000
EMPIRE	8,562,920 Square Miles.	252,564,847	1,079,107,333 £	142,227,561 Tons.	207,501,611 £

92
64
36

Revenue.
£
92,640,000

Tons.
24

57
27
14

Million

364

175

74
57
50
20
27
14
6

Millions

DIAGRAM

TABLE No.

Showing by Ocean Districts the value of One Year's Trade of the British Empire—distinguishing between Foreign Trade of the United Kingdom—the Foreign Trade of the Colonies and Dependencies—the interchange between the Mother Country and the outlying Empire—and also the interchange between British Possessions abroad.—1883.





TABLE No. 7.

of the British Empire—
the Foreign Trade of the
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DIAGRAM

TABLE No. 8.


Comparing the Trade and Revenue of Countries having sea boards on Pacific Ocean only.

	Trade in Million £			Revenue in Million £	Remarks as to effective Naval power.
	Millions.	25	50	100	
Peru	4				Destroyed in War with Chili.
Japan	4				7 Sea-going modern Cruisers, etc., etc.
Chili	4				8 do. do. do. do.
China	4				7 do. do. do. do.
Australasia					Maintains no Ocean Cruisers.

DIAGRAM

TABLE No. 9.

Showing aggregate of Area ; the Annual Trade ; Revenue (and the Expenditure on War Forces) of British North America, South Africa, and Australasia, as compared with the United States.



Million. £	OUR COLONIAL EMPIRE.			THE UNITED STATES.			Million. £
	Trade.	Revenue.	Expenditure on War Forces.	Trade.	Revenue.	Expenditure on War Forces.	
176			Cannot be shown on this Scale.				293
37							72
	£ 276,442,762	37,522,433	802,559	293,299,000	72,608,000	11,737,714	£
	1	2	3	1	2	3	


N.B.—This Diagram excludes from the comparison the United Kingdom and the Empire of Dependencies, *i.e.*, India, etc., etc.

J. C. R. COLOMB,
Capt. late R.M.A.

STRATEGICAL SKETCH OF TO ACCOMPANY LECTURE & DIAGRAMS ON IM

Journal R.U.S. Institution.
Vol. 30.

by *J. C.R. Colomb, former*



Designed by Capt. J. C.R. Colomb.

SKETCH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

GRAMS ON IMPERIAL FEDERATION, NAVAL & MILITARY.

by J. C. R. Colomb, formerly Capt. R.M.A.

Plate III.

